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involves the internal affairs of the corporation. To the contrary, for the
Fourth Circuit this corporation's cancellation of stock options is a question
of pure contract interpretation, turning on an examination of the provisions
of the stock options themselves, the terms of the stock option plan, and
the law of the state in which the contract was made binding.
This decision is in accord with the Eight Circuit's decision in Freeze v.
American Home Products Corp.58 9 In Freeze a corporation cancelled the
stock options of a former employee who accepted employment with a
competitor of the issuing corporation. The Freeze court applied the law of
the state where the corporation administered the plan and where award
decisions were made. 90 Cases in other jurisdictions which have dealt with
the cancellation of stock options by former employers do not involve the
specific issue of subsequent employment of the former employee by a
competitor of the issuing corporation.
591
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Service & Training, Inc. v. Data General Corp.
963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992)
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "contract[s], combination[s]
., or conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade. ' 592 Section 1 thus prohibits tying
arrangements that stifle trade by conditioning the purchase of one product
upon purchase of another product.5 93 To establish the existence of an
589. 839 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1988).
590. Freeze v. American Home Prods. Corp., 839 F.2d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 1988). The Freeze
court considered the validity of a forfeiture provision in a management incentive plan. Id. The
provision stated that an employee would forfeit the undelivered portion of the bonus plan if the
employee became an officer, director, employee, owner or partner of a competitor. The court
held that the laws of New York state, where the plan was administered and where the award
decisions were made, controlled and that the provision was enforceable. Id. at 418.
591. See Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 1073, 1083-84 (10th Cir. 1985) (supporting decision
of corporation finding employee dismissed for "cause" sufficient to prohibit exercise of stock
options, such options being subject to condition precedent and therefore not wages recoverable
by discharged employee); Hainline v. General Motors Corp., 444 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1971)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant and remanding for further proceedings in case
determining right of former employee to unexercised stock options, specifically questioning power
of corporation to cancel such options); Carlson v. Viacom Int'l Inc., 566 F. Supp. 289, 290-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (supporting corporation's refusal to allow exercise of stock options by terminated
employee, in option agreement requiring current employment for exercise of options); Harrison
v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 342 F. Supp. 348, 350 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972)
(supporting denial of exercise of stock options by former employee); Fredricks v. Georgia-Pac.
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 422, 423, 427-28 (E.D. Pa. 1971), appeal dismissed, 474 F.2d 1338 (3rd
Cir. 1972) (finding forfeiture clause in stock bonus trust may be unenforceable, but rights to
unexercised stock options could be terminated, if employee was induced to resign through
harassment and humiliation).
592. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
593. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (holding tying
arrangement violative of 15 U.S.C. § 1).
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unlawful tying arrangement, a plaintiff must show the existence of two
separate products, an agreement conditioning purchase of the tying product
upon purchase of the tied product (or at least upon an agreement not to
purchase the tied product from another party), the seller's possession of
sufficient economic power in the tying product market to restrain compe-
tition, and a substantial impact on interstate commerce. 59 In order to
withstand a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must show a genuine
issue of material fact in regard to each of these elements .
95
In Service & Training, Inc. v. Data General Corp.596 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether an
unlawful tying arrangement exists where, in the absence of an express
agreement, a seller licenses its product exclusively to parties that do not
purchase services from the seller's competitors. In addition, the Fourth
Circuit reviewed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction for
the defendant on the defendant's copyright infringement claim.
In Data General, the plaintiff, Service & Training, Inc. (STI), maintained
and repaired computer systems built by the defendant, Data General Cor-
poration. Data General had developed and copyrighted a software program
called "MV/ADEX" for use in diagnosing malfunctions in its computers.
STI sought access to MV/ADEX for its own servicing of Data General
computer systems. In 1989 STI filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland asserting that Data General had violated section
1 of the Sherman Act. STI claimed that Data General licensed MV/ADEX
only to customers who did not purchase support services from Data Ge-
neral's competitors. STI claimed that this arrangement unlawfully tied MV/
ADEX licenses to purchases of Data General's repair services. Data General
then instituted a copyright infringement action based on STI's unauthorized
use of MV/ADEX.
The district court granted summary judgment for Data General on the
tying claim on the ground that STI had failed to establish a question of
material fact in regard to whether MV/ADEX and Data General's support
services comprised "separate products." In addition, the district court
granted Data General a preliminary injunction on its copyright infringement
claim.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that MV/
ADEX and Data General's repair services were not separate products. The
court stressed that the inquiry into the question of separate products should
focus not on the functional relation of the products, but on the character
of the demand for the products. The court found that MV/ADEX and
Data General's repair services were separate products because demand for
594. Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 683 (4th Cir. 1992).
595. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986)
(requiring plaintiff to show genuine issue of material fact regarding injurious conspiracy to
survive motion for summary judgment).
596. 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
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the use of MV/ADEX existed independently from demand for Data Ge-
neral's repair services. Data General licensed MV/ADEX to cooperative
maintenance organizations (CMOs), which do their own servicing, without
also selling them Data General's repair services. In addition, Data General
provided repair services to customers to whom it did not license MV/ADEX.
Although the Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's rationale, it
affirmed summary judgment for Data General because of the absence of
any evidence of agreements between Data General and its customers. The
court emphasized that an unlawful tying arrangement exists only where two
or more parties agree that the seller will sell a certain product only on
condition that the buyer(s) will also purchase a second product, or on
condition that the buyer(s) will not purchase a similar second product from
the seller's competitors. The Fourth Circuit found that STI had produced
no evidence that Data General had such an agreement with its customers.
STI argued that a tying arrangement existed even in the absence of
such evidence because Data General licensed MV/ADEX exclusively to
CMOs, customers who, by definition, do not purchase repair services from
any of Data General's competitors. In support of its argument, STI relied
on the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.597 In Eastman
Kodak a copier equipment manufacturer agreed to sell parts only to cus-
tomers who serviced their own equipment. The manufacturer's written sales
terms explicitly stipulated this condition. The Ninth Circuit found a material
issue of fact as to whether an unlawful tying arrangement existed. The
Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the condition arose from an
independent action of the manufacturer. Rather, the court concluded that
if this type of conduct were deemed independent, then virtually all tying
arrangements would fall outside the reach of Section 1.
The Fourth Circuit not only refused to apply the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning to the case at bar, but also rejected outright the Ninth Circuit's
holding. The Fourth Circuit stated that it would not find an unlawful tying
arrangement even if Data General had explicitly stated in its licensing
agreements that it would license MV/ADEX only to customers who did
their own repair work. The court explained that a seller's unilateral decision
to sell its products only to a certain type of customer was an independent
action outside the reach of Section 1. The court emphasized that in order
to establish a claim under Section 1, a plaintiff would have to show an
affirmative agreement between the buyer and the seller to stifle competition.
Applying this reasoning to Data General, the Fourth Circuit found that
the evidence showed only a unilateral decision by Data General to license
its product to certain types of customers. The court examined situations in
which Data General licensed MV/ADEX to CMOs as well as situations in
which Data General sold its own repair services. The court found no evidence
that Data General had agreed to license MV/ADEX to CMOs exclusively
597. 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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on the condition that the CMOs not purchase repair services from Data
General's competitors. In response to STI's claim that no such evidence
was necessary because CMOs by definition do not purchase repair services,
the court stated that that fact was at least as consistent with the absence
of an illegal arrangement as with the existence of one.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found no evidence of tying arrangements
in regard to Data General's repair service customers. Data General did not
license MV/ADEX to its service customers at all. STI argued that the court
should consider access to MV/ADEX, as well as licensing of MV/ADEX,
as a product unlawfully tied to Data General's repair services. The court
rejected this argument because it found that mere access to MV/ADEX,
without licensing for independent use, was indistinguishable from the repair
services and therefore separate products did not exist. Furthermore, the
court found no evidence of actual agreements between Data General and
its repair service customers.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit considered several corollary issues relating
to the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against STI on Data
General's copyright infringement claim. The court found that Data General
had a prima facie copyright infringement claim on the basis of its certificates
of copyright registration for MV/ADEX coupled with evidence of unau-
thorized use of MV/ADEX by STI. STI claimed that a 1976 settlement
agreement between the parties gave STI the right to use confidential Data
General material for purposes of maintaining and installing Data General
computers. The court determined that the agreement did not require Data
General to turn over newly created confidential software, such as MV/
ADEX, to STI. The court then summarily rejected STI's equitable estoppel
and copyright misuse defenses and affirmed the preliminary injunction.
In Data General the Fourth Circuit openly disputed the holding of the
Ninth Circuit in Eastman Kodak.98 In Eastman Kodak the Ninth Circuit
found evidence of an unlawful tying arrangement where the seller's written
sales terms excluded potential buyers who purchased services from the seller's
competitors. In Data General the Fourth Circuit found no evidence of an
unlawful tying arrangement where the seller sold licenses only to buyers
who did not purchase services from the seller's competitors, but where the
seller had no written terms stating that policy. In dicta, the Fourth Circuit
stated its coniviction that Eastman Kodak was wrongly decided. The Fourth
Circuit explained that it would not have found an unlawful tying arrange-
ment even if Data General's sales agreements had contained an explicit
statement of its exclusive sales policy.
The Fourth Circuit 's conclusions regarding Eastman Kodak may be
suspect. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eastman Kodak
decision, but it did not directly address the issue presented here.599 Kodak
598. Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990),
aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
599. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
1993]
